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PROCLUS AND DAMASCIUS ON ΦΙΛΟΤΙΜΙΑ
he Neoplatonic Psychology of a Political Emotion
Robbert M. van den Berg
Leiden University 
Résumé. Cet article examine les opinions des néoplatoniciens tardifs sur le 
phénomène social de la philotimia («  amour des honneurs  »  ; «  ambition  »). 
Sur la base du Commentaire de l’Alcibiade de Proclus, on montre que la philo-
timia est une émotion qui résulte d’une compréhension imparfaite de la véritable 
nature de l’honneur et du pouvoir. La mauvaise philotimia pousse les ambitieux 
à poursuivre une carrière politique en quête de pouvoir mondain et de prestige, 
au prix de l’étude de la philosophie. La bonne philotimia, au contraire, peut les 
pousser à rechercher ce qui est véritablement bien et donc les mettre sur la voie 
de la philosophie. L’histoire fournit maints exemples de bonne et de mauvaise 
philotimia. Damascius, dans sa Vie d’Isidore, en fait usage pour éloigner ses 
lecteurs de l’arène politique et les conduire vers la poursuite de la philosophie.
Summary. his paper examines the views of the later Neoplatonists on the social 
phenomenon of philotimia (“love of honour(s)”; “ambition”). On the basis of Proclus’ 
Commentary on the Alcibiades it is concluded that for the Neoplatonists philotimia 
is an ambiguous emotion that results rom an imperfect understanding of the true 
nature of honour and power. Bad philotimia prompts ambitious people to pursue a 
political career in search of worldly power and prestige at the cost of the study of philo-
sophy. Good philotimia, on the contrary, may inspire them to search for what is truly 
good and hence put them on the track of philosophy. History provides many examples 
of both good and bad philotimia. Damascius, in his Life of Isidore, uses such stories 
to steer his readers away rom the political arena towards the pursuit of philosophy.

1. Introduction*
Emotions are not universal. We do not have, for example, an equivalent of 
the ancient emotion of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ.1 Usually translated as ‘ambition’, it literally 
means something like “the love of honour(s)”, “the desire for public esteem”. 
It may be an alien emotion to us, yet it was one of the driving, and oten 
disruptive, forces of ancient political life. It was what made the ancient poli-
ticians, invariable members of the elite, tick and spend their money on public 
services in order to outshine their peers. his holds true for classical Athens, 
but it holds equally true for the world of late antiquity. Peter Brown, in his 
well-known book he Making of Late Antiquity, reserves an entire chapter 
for the phenomenon of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ. Talking about the 3rd century, which he 
describes as “an age of ambition”, he comments:
[ΦǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ] committed members of the upper class to blatant competitiveness 
on all levels of social life. his was expressed with a candor and an abrasiveness 
peculiar to the society of the Roman Empire. Whatever reticence we may 
associate with the classical polis had long vanished.2
Brown is writing about the beginnings of late antiquity, but when one 
browses through the fragments of Damascius’ Life of Isidore in which the last 
Diadoch paints a colourful, if not unbiased, picture of the intellectual and 
political life in Athens and Alexandria at the very end of late antiquity, one 
* Versions of this paper were read at the colloquium “he Power of the Form: Platonists 
and the Roman Empire” (Gargnano, 2014) and at the MusaPH Oberseminar (Munich, 
2015). I have proited much from the stimulating discussions at both occasions.
1. he Neoplatonists, as do other Greek authors, refer to ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as a ǚǆǒǙǜ, the word 
that since Aristotle is used in ancient Greek to signify something like our modern concept 
of emotion, hence my description of it as a political emotion. On ǚǆǒǙǜ as emotion and the 
problems involved in deining both ǚǆǒǙǜ and emotion, see, for example, Konstan (2015 
p. 401-402), who doubts whether ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is an emotion in the modern sense, yet observes 
(o.c. p. 402 n. 1) that homas Hobbes De cive 3, 26 lists ambition among “the perturbations 
of the mind”.
2. Brown 1978 p. 31.
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inds that in the meantime little had changed. He oten invokes ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as 
an explanation for people’s actions, both laudable and reproachable ones. 
By doing so, he shares the traditional view of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as an ambivalent 
emotion as we ind it elsewhere in ancient Greek literature.3
It would be wrong, however, to think of Damascius’ frequent references 
to ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as commonplace remarks. hey are informed by Neoplatonic 
relections on this omnipresent and powerful political emotion. he topic 
was especially discussed in relation to the Platonic First Alcibiades. As we shall 
see, it is no coincidence that this was the irst of the traditional curriculum 
of twelve Platonic dialogues that Neoplatonic novices were made to study. 
In the anonymous Prolegomena to Plato, a text roughly contemporary to 
Damascius, those students were told that the skopos (aim) of the Alcibiades is 
(…) to expose the ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ that lives in everyone of us. In each of us there 
lives the ambition of an Alcibiades, which we must discipline and train for 
something better.4 
his short remark is interesting for two reasons. First, the term ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ 
occurs only once and without much emphasis in the entire dialogue (Plato 
Alc. 1, 122c7). It thus tells us more about what was on the minds of the 
late Neoplatonists than about the actual content of the Alcibiades itself. 
Secondly, the Neoplatonists apparently thought that the sentiment of 
ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ could fulil a useful role in the education of the young, provided 
that it was properly directed. his is at odds with Plato, who, for example in 
the Symposium and in the Phaedrus, regarded ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ for the most part as 
an undesirable emotion.5
his somewhat unexpected interpretation of the Alcibiades raises the 
following questions: (1) what exactly, according to the later Neoplatonists, 
is ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ? (2) why do they think of it as a potentially useful emotion? 
and, inally, (3) how do they harness this emotion for philosophical 
purposes? he irst part of this paper (§§ 2-4) seeks to answer the irst two 
questions by analysing Proclus’ discussion of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in his Commentary 
on the Alcibiades. he second part of the paper (§§ 5-6) deals with the third 
question. I shall argue that instances of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in Marinus’ Life of Proclus 
and Damascius’ Life of Isidore are meant to teach the readers une leçon par 
l’exemple, not unlike the Lives of Plutarch of Chaeronea.
3.  As the editors M. de Pourcq and G. Roskam (2012 p. 1-8, quotation on p. 2) put 
it in the introduction to a recent volume on ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in the Middle Platonist Plutarch of 
Chaeronea and contemporary authors: “From its earliest occurrences in extant Greek 
literature, the notion of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is thus characterized by a fundamental ambivalence.” For 
examples of the ambivalent attitude towards ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in Greek literature, see also the seminal 
paper by F. Frazier (1988, esp. p. 112-116) on ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in Plutarch.
4. Anonymous Prolegomena, 23, 22-24; trans. Westerink 1962.
5. On Plato’s predominantly negative view of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ, see Renaut 2013.
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2. Proclus on the philotimia of Alcibiades
In the First Alcibiades Socrates tries to win over young Alcibiades to the 
cause of philosophy. he dialogue stresses the ambitions of this cocky young 
man who was in due time to become one of the most notorious politicians of 
the ancient world. As I just noted, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is barely mentioned in the text. 
All the same it became a central theme in later evaluations of the character of 
Alcibiades. According to Plutarch in his Life of Alcibiades, for example, both 
Alcibiades’ corrupters and Socrates appealed to his ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ and ambition. 
he former did so with evil intentions, Socrates, on the other hand, tried to 
direct Alcibiades’ ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ towards noble things.6
Socrates’ interest in this enfant terrible of Athenian high society called 
out for an explanation. Why did Socrates think him worthy of his afections? 
Proclus’ discussion of this issue (in Alc. 133, 18-139, 9) leads him to dwell on 
the nature of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as a noble emotion. Fusing the myth of the winged 
charioteer and the myth of Er from the Republic into one seamless account, 
Proclus (in Alc. 136, 10-1137, 1) explains Alcibiades’ ambition from his 
experiences before birth. According to the myth of Er, those souls that have 
lived well will spend the next thousand years in heaven, while those souls 
that have behaved badly in a previous life are thrown into some subterranean 
space were they are punished. Proclus identiies those souls that spend time 
in heaven with the souls that according to the myth of the winged charioteer 
in the Phaedrus follow the Olympian gods when they tour the heavens in 
contemplation of the Forms. Each soul follows the god that suits his persona-
lity best. Alcibiades is one of those souls that before his present life followed 
in the train of Zeus, the universal ruler who is characterized by divine power 
and honour. Even though these souls get glimpses of real divine power and 
honour, they do not necessarily fully comprehend its nature.7 As the Phae-
drus-myth insists, the human souls have a hard time controlling their horses. 
herefore, unlike their divine leaders, they do not enjoy the uninterrupted 
contemplation of the Forms. In a similar vein, according to the myth of 
Er, some of those souls that had been awarded time in heaven had in their 
previous lives behaved well because they happened to live in a well-governed 
city, not because they had studied philosophy and grasped the true essence 
of morality. As a result, such souls, when the time to choose one’s next life 
comes, tend to do so rashly and unwisely. In Proclus’ word, such souls
6. Cf. Plutarch Alc. 6, 3 (on the abuse of Alcibiades’ ambition by his corrupters) and 7, 5 
(on Socrates’ attempts to put Alcibiades’ ambition to good use). On the theme of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ 
in general, see Nikolaidis 2012, and p. 43-44 in particular on these passages.
7. But what might this true, divine ǞǓǖǈ be? he word τιμή may also be used to refer to an 
oice that is entrusted to someone (cf. LSJ s.v. ǞǓǖǈ I. 3). In the present context these oices 
with which the gods are honoured refer to the responsibility that is assigned to each one of 
them for a certain part of the universe.
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 (...) long themselves for a similar life and want to rule as many people as 
possible and to excel over the other people, just as those gods rule over the 
realm of becoming, and they want to steer the universe, just as those steer 
everything that is inferior to them. Out of desire for this, they rush at tyran-
ny, power and honours (Ǟǋῖǜ ǞǓǖǋῖǜ ἐǚǓǚǑǎ̅ǝǓ), and some of them choose a 
life dedicated to honour (ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ ǌǉǙǜ), others the life of a tyrant.8 
Ambitious people, because they labour under a misapprehension of the 
true, divine nature of power and honour, now pursue mere “images and 
shadows” (Ǟὰ ǏἴǎǣǕǋ ǔǋὶ Ǟὰǜ ǝǔǓὰǜ ǠǓǕǙǠǛǙǗǙῦǗǞǋǓ, in Alc. 136, 13) of it. All 
the same, since true power and honour are divine, the aspirations of tyrants 
and honour-loving people are noble impulses towards the intelligible, away 
from the material realm. As such they are superior to people who pursue a 
life of the fulilment of bodily desires. he latter are souls that spent time in 
the subterranean prisons and as a result are now only interested in instant 
gratiication (Proclus in Alc. 138, 3-9). For this reason, ambitious souls like 
that of Alcibiades stand to proit much from the attention of philosophers 
like Socrates who can help them to clarify their inborn, yet fuzzy, notions 
about power and honour.
In an alternative explanation of why the ambitious Alcibiades is worthy 
of Socrates’ attention, Proclus focuses on the relation between ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ and 
ǒǟǖǦǜ. In the Phaedrus, for example, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is especially associated with 
the good horse.9 As we can learn from Hermias’ commentary, the Athenian 
Neoplatonists assumed that the two horses stand for the mortal aspects of 
the human soul: the good horse represents ǒǟǖǦǜ, the bad horse the desi-
ring element of the soul; the charioteer, by contrast, represents the immortal, 
rational aspect of the soul.10 he mortal aspects of the soul are hence them-
selves not rational, but whereas the bad horse only listens to brute force, the 
good horse, ǒǟǖǦǜ, is susceptible to reason. herefore the good horse is an 
ally of reason in its attempts to keep the bad horse of non-rational desires 
in check, just as the military in the Republic, characterized by their ǒǟǖǦǜ, 
are auxiliaries to the philosopher-kings. In his Commentary on the Alcibiades 
Proclus picks up on this association between the reasonable ǒǟǖǦǜ and 
ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ. He irst points to Plato’s account of the degeneration of political 
constitutions in Republic VIII:
(…) let it be observed that ater the constitution which is in accord with rea-
son (ǔǋǞὰ ǞὸǗ ǕǦǍǙǗ) comes the honour-regarding and timocratic form of go-
vernment (ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ ǔǋὶ ǞǓǖǙǔǛǋǞǓǔǈ); for the latter arises immediately ater 
8. Proclus in Alc. 137, 13-19.
9. Cf. Plato Phdr. 253d6: the good horse is a ǞǓǖ˛ǜ ἐǛǋǝǞὴǜ ǖǏǞὰ ǝǣǠǛǙǝǧǗǑǜ ǞǏ ǔǋὶ ǋɍǎǙῦǜ.
10. Cf. Hermias in Phdr. p. 193, 20 Couvreur 1901; p. 202, 14-15 Lucarini-Moreschini 
2012 (ἽǚǚǙǟǜ ǙɯǗ ǕǋǖǌǆǗǏǓ ǒǟǖὸǗ ǔǋὶ ἐǚǓǒǟǖǉǋǗ) commenting on Plato Phdr. 253d.
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the former and the departure from the best form of life proceeds to this kind 
irst, as Socrates observes in the Republic.11
As is well-known, Socrates in Republic 8 describes ive diferent types 
of constitution which are related to the tripartite psychology that he had 
developed previously. Each constitution derives its particular character from 
the type of soul that dominates it. he best constitution, the aristocracy, 
is led by souls in which the rational part is in charge. Next (R.  8, 545a2-
550c3) comes the honour-loving constitution (ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ ǚǙǕǓǞǏǉǋ), which 
Socrates by want of an existing name calls ǞǓǖǙǔǛǋǞǉǋ. In this type of society, 
associated by Socrates with Sparta, souls dominated by their spirited part 
(ǒǟǖǦǜ) rule. Ater this second-best constitution follow three inferior types 
of constitution, which are dominated by souls in which the desiring element 
rules supreme.
Proclus takes a more positive view of timocracy than Plato does. Whereas 
the latter presents it as the irst step on the way down already “laden with 
countless evils” (R. 8, 544c4-5), Proclus thinks of it as the inal step on the way 
up. Reading the account of the gradual decline of constitutions as a descrip-
tion of the descent of the human soul into the realm of matter, Proclus claims 
that Plato calls ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ “the ultimate tunic”.12 hese “tunics” (ǡǓǞ̅ǗǏǜ), are 
layers of increasingly material substance that cover the immortal, rational 
soul when it descends and that together constitute the mortal, non-rational 
11. Proclus in Alc. 138, 10-14; trans. O’Neill 1971.
12. Proclus in Alc. 138, 15-16: ǎǓὸ ǔǋὶ ὁ ΠǕǆǞǣǗ ἔǝǡǋǞǙǗ ǡǓǞ̅Ǘǋ Ǟ̅Ǘ Ǣǟǡ̅Ǘ ἀǚǏǔǆǕǏǓ ǞὴǗ 
ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋǗ. he identiication of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ with the ultimate tunic of the soul is a common 
place, see the informative discussion by Segonds (1985 p. 204, n. 3 to p. 115). As Segonds 
notes, the phrase as such does not occur in Plato’s writings, yet a remark along those lines is 
attributed to him by Dioscurides in his Memories, quoted in Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 9, 
507: “But besides being malicious, Plato was eager for fame (ǚǛὸǜ Ǟ˜ ǔǋǔǙǑǒǏǉᾳ ǔǋὶ ǠǓǕǦǎǙǘǙǜ), 
for he said that ‘he last thing we put of at death itself is the tunic of fame (ἔǝǡǋǞǙǗ ǞὸǗ Ǟ˛ǜ 
ǎǦǘǑǜ ǡǓǞ̅Ǘǋ), in our will, in our funerals, and in our tombs’” (trans. Douglas Olson 2008 
adapted). he precise reading of the passage is a matter of dispute. Douglas Olson in his recent 
Loeb-edition follows the reading of the manuscripts (ἔǝǡǋǞǙǗ ǞὸǗ Ǟ˛ǜ ǎǦǘǑǜ ǡǓǞ̅Ǘǋ), against 
Kaibel’s conjecture (ǞὸǗ Ǟ˛ǜ ǠǓǕǙǎǙǘǉǋǜ ǡǓǞ̅Ǘǋ, cf. Kaibel 1887-1890). He comments (2008, 
p. 281 n. a): “hese words do not occur in Plato’s extant writings: even if he wrote them, ǎǦǘǑǜ, 
which Dioscurides took to mean “fame,” may rather mean “false opinion,” cf. heaet. 161e, 
and to alter the text as Kaibel does is to disguise the lengths to which this detractor will go in 
distorting what Plato said.” But what do funerals and tombs have to do with false opinion? 
Rather, I suggest, Plato censures the notoriously expensive burials and tombs of the Athenian 
elite, which were intended to secure post-mortem fame. Plato was not alone in his criticism, 
as appears from repeated restrictive legislation, for example (allegedly) by Solon and, later, 
by Demetrius of Phaleron in 317 b.c.e. hus, Dioscurides did not distort the intention of 
Plato’s words, even though, of course, these do not support the slanderous suggestion that 
Plato himself was ǠǓǕǦǎǙǘǙǜ. Even so, there is no need to change the perfectly sound ǎǦǘǑǜ 
into ǠǓǕǙǎǙǘǉǋǜ.
156 Robbert M. van den Berg
aspect of the soul.13 While soul itself is an active principle, matter is passive. 
Hence, the more material the descending soul grows, the more afections 
(ǚǆǒǑ) it is subjected to. he ultimate goal of human life is to strip of these 
“tunics” and return to our original pristine condition, so that we shall again 
be “‘naked’, as the Oracle says, and establish ourselves near God, having 
become pure and unalloyed rationality (ǕǦǍǙǜ)” (Proclus in Alc. 138, 22-139, 
1). Souls that are characterized by philotimia are almost naked, i.e. purely 
rational, apart from that last tunic—as opposed to souls that are in the grip 
of all sorts of bodily desires.14 hey “dwell in the porch of reason”, and “have 
characters that are closely related to reason”, since “our ǒǟǖǦǜ is nearer to it 
than the desiring element.”15
3. Alcibiades and Pericles: the ambivalence of philotimia
So far, Proclus has concentrated on the positive aspects of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ. 
Since the ǒǟǖǦǜ is the part of the mortal soul that is most closely related 
to the immortal, rational part of the soul, it may act as a powerful ally of 
reason in its ight against the unruly movements of the non-rational desi-
ring part of the mortal soul. On the other hand, however, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ on its 
own, without the guidance of reason, turns into a corrupting force, as the 
case of Alcibiades aptly illustrates. In his Commentary on the Alcibiades 
Proclus highlights this ambivalence of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ by contrasting the good 
politician Pericles to the bad politician Alcibiades. Socrates (Alc. 1, 105a7-
b3) suspects that Alcibiades, who is about to enter the political arena, hopes 
that the Athenians will think him more worthy of honour (ἄǘǓǙǜ ǞǓǖᾶǝǒǋǓ) 
than Pericles or anyone else before him. From this phrase, Proclus deduces 
13. Cf., e.g., Proclus in Ti. 3, 297, 20-4: the human soul, when it descends to earth, is 
invested with diferent ǡǓǞ̅ǗǏǜ from the diferent elements, i.e. an aerial, watery and earthy 
one; inally, it receives the visible body.
14. Proclus in Alc. 138, 15-19: “For that reason Plato calls the desire for honour (ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ) 
‘the ultimate tunic’ of the souls. For while disdain for money and contempt for pleasure are 
present even in rather average souls too, many people that are thought of as impressive are 
overcome by honour, reputation and power.” 
15. Cf. Proclus in Alc. 139, 3-9. he expression ἐǗ ǚǛǙǒǧǛǙǓǜ ǞǙῦ ǕǦǍǙǟ (“in the porch of 
reason”) is apparently inspired by Plato Phlb. 64c1 ἐǚὶ ǖὲǗ ǞǙῖǜ ǞǙῦ ἀǍǋǒǙῦ ǗῦǗ ἤǎǑ ǚǛǙǒǧǛǙǓǜ 
(“the porch of the Good”), a phrase repeatedly quoted by Proclus and other Neoplatonists. 
he expression “porch of reason” in relation to the honour-loving ǒǟǖǦǜ, recurs in the course 
on the Phaedrus taught by Proclus’ master Syrianus and recorded by Hermias. Syrianus 
(Hermias in Phdr. p. 194, 9-13 Couvreur 1901; p. 202, 29-203, 13 Lucarini-Moreschini 2012) 
connects the myth of the winged charioteer to a discussion of the distribution of the parts of 
soul through the body in Timaeus 69e-70b. here the ǒǟǖǦǜ, the best of the mortal elements 
of the soul, i.e. Proclus’ “tunics” (ǡǓǞ̅ǗǏǜ), is located in between the immortal, rational part 
of the soul in the head and the non-rational desiring part situated in the underbelly, as some 
sort of “guardhouse” located before the citadel, i.e. in a location comparable to Syrianus’ and 
Proclus’ “porch of reason”.
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that, unlike Pericles, Alcibiades is not concerned about the good of the city 
or its preservation, but only about honour and power (ǞǓǖὴ ǔǋὶ ǎǟǗǋǝǞǏǉǋ). 
He is ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ, not ǚǛǙǗǙǑǞǓǔǦǜ, i.e. he does not imitate the providential 
care of the gods as a good politician should.16 “History tells us (Ⱦ ɎǝǞǙǛǉǋ 
ǕǇǍǏǓ)” thus Proclus (in Alc. 147, 10-15), that “Pericles was the most illus-
trious among the demagogues”, because he had studied philosophy with 
Anaxagoras. Alcibiades, by contrast, lacked this philosophical reinement, as 
appears from the fact that there is no limit to his ambitions. Since he wants 
to outdo both Pericles and anybody else before him, Proclus calls this sort of 
ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ a ǚǆǒǙǜ (“emotion”):
For, generally speaking, each of the emotions is without limit and measure, 
since it is not controlled by reason. For reason is limit, while passion is wit-
hout reason and limit.17 
In fact, on the Neoplatonic scale of virtues, the political virtues in 
general are identiied with the Peripatetic ideal of metriopatheia (measured 
emotions), as opposed to the subsequent purifying virtues which aim at 
apatheia (no emotions at all). hese political virtues thus “adorn those who 
are still here and make them better by limiting and putting measure to the 
impulses of the ǒǟǖǦǜ and the desires, and the emotions (ǚǋǒǈ) in general by 
eliminating false opinions”, as Marinus deines it in his Life of Proclus (18, 
11-17) while paraphrasing Plotinus’ deinition in Enn. 1, 2 [19] 2, 13-17.18
Marinus supplies this deinition at the end of his discussion of Proclus’ 
political virtues and corresponding activities in the course of which he also 
addresses the issue of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ:
Proclus was indeed ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ, but he did not adopt this ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as an emo-
tion (ǚǆǒǙǜ), as is the case with others. Rather he had this ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in regard 
to virtue and the good alone. And probably nothing great would ever happen 
among humans without such a force.19
16. Proclus in Alc. 146, 20-23. his ambivalence of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ had already been pointed out 
by Aristotle: “We blame the honour-loving man (ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ) as aiming at honour more than is 
right and from the wrong sources ... But we sometimes praise the honour-loving man as being 
manly and a lover of what is noble (ǠǓǕǦǔǋǕǙǜ)...” (Aristotle EN 4, 4, 1125b8-12; trans. Ross-
Ackrill-Urmson 1980 adapted). In other words, the problem with some ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǓ is that they 
want to receive as much honour as they can get, regardless of the reasons for which they are 
honoured. Plutarch Agis. 2, 3 (discussed by Nikolaidis 2012 p. 49-50) makes a similar point.
17. Proclus in Alc. 147, 26-28.
18.  On the political virtues and their place on the Neoplatonic scale of virtues, see 
O’Meara 2003 p.  40-49 (in particular p. 41 on Plotinus Enn.  1, 2 [19] 2 and p.  44 on 
metriopatheia) and, more recently, Linguiti 2013, who rightly points out that whereas 
Plotinus had stressed the separation between the lower, political, virtues and the higher ones, 
later Platonists emphasised the continuity between these virtues. he present discussion of 
the role of philotimia in the Life of Proclus aptly illustrates this emphasis on continuity.
19. Marinus Procl. 16, 13-17. For the last remark, cf. Plato Smp. 178d1-4.
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Marinus here presents Proclus’ ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ as an undeniable, yet somewhat 
uneasy fact about Proclus’ personality. One might have expected that a cele-
brated philosopher such as Proclus would have managed to become totally 
“naked”, completely stripped of all emotions. Yet, as we have seen, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ 
is the last and most di cult “tunic” to get rid of. Marinus hastens, however, 
to explain that Proclus’ ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ was not some unchecked emotion, but 
instead a noble impulse towards the good.
Marinus’ remarks about Proclus’ political activities as well as his ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ, 
remind us that Proclus was not only a loty metaphysician, but also a member 
of the Athenian elite. his aspect of personality hardly ever transpires in his 
many philosophical writings. In his Hymn to Athena (H. 7, 47-50), however, 
Proclus prays that Athena may not only give him spiritual goods, but also 
worldly ones such as “fame” (ǔǕǇǙǜ) and a “place of prominence among the 
people” (ǚǛǙǏǎǛǉǑǗ ἐǗὶ ǕǋǙῖǜ). As Nicole Belayche has recently observed these 
prayers it “parfaitement dans l’idéal de philotimia qui animait les membres 
des élites civiques et guidait leurs actions publiques”.20 According to Marinus 
(Marinus Procl. 12, 9-15), Proclus’ teacher Plutarch of Athens put this love 
of honour of his young pupil to good philosophical use. “Serving himself of 
the ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ of the young man as an instrument”, he convinced Proclus to 
turn his notes of the lectures of Plutarch on the Phaedo into a proper book 
by telling him that if he did so, there would be a commentary under his name 
on the Phaedo.21
4. Intermediate conclusions
Let us for a moment pause and take stock of what we have learnt from 
Proclus’ discussion of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ in the Alcibiades:
(1) Proclus thinks of the politicians’ desire for honour as a noble impulse, 
since honour as such is a divine thing.
(2) he problem with politicians, however, is that they have lost view 
of true, intelligible honour and pursue a shadow of it in this world (public 
esteem). If they come to see what real, intelligible honour is, they will turn 
away from the political domain and concentrate on the philosophical pursuit 
of the intelligible. 
(3) ΦǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is strongly associated with the ǒǟǖǦǜ, an element of the 
mortal soul that is related to but not identical with the immortal rational 
part of the soul. It needs the rational part to impose order and limit on it, the 
so-called political virtue of metriopatheia.
(4) “Disciplining and training ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ for something better”—which 
20. Belayche 2013 p. 97.
21. Likewise, Porphyry (Plot. 19, 20-22 ) claims to have prompted Plotinus to write down 
a more articulated and fuller version of his views by playing on his ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ. I am grateful 
to one of the anonymous readers of this journal for drawing my attention to these passages.
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according to the anonymous Prolegomena is what Plato intended with the 
Alcibiades—is therefore as much a matter of the improvement of our thinking 
(a better articulation of the notion of honour) as that of a sub-rational part 
of our soul (i.e. the ǒǟǖǦǜ).
(5) Given that the ǒǟǖǦǜ is sub-rational, it follows that in addition to 
the philosophical clariication of the concept of honour, some other, sub-ra-
tional means of improvement are needed as well.
5. Moral lessons from history
In the second part of this paper, I shall concentrate on the use of history as 
a way to discipline the sub-rational ǒǟǖǦǜ, the last “tunic” that envelops our 
rational soul. When elsewhere in his Commentary on the Alcibiades (224, 
1-226, 8) Proclus sketches his theory of paideia, he explains that whereas the 
perfection of the “tunic” related to physical desires is a matter of habituation 
(it is ater all not rational at all), that of the tunic in between the desiring and 
rational part of the soul should be perfected by means of “admonishments 
and instructive discourse” (ǎǓὰ Ǟ˛ǜ ǗǙǟǒǏǝǉǋǜ ǔǋὶ Ǟ̅Ǘ ǎǓǎǋǝǔǋǕǓǔ̅Ǘ ǕǦǍǣǗ; 
in Alc. 225, 6-7; cf. 225, 3-4), just as one might expect in the case of a soul-fa-
culty that is susceptible to reason, yet does not itself reason.22 It is the sort of 
instruction that one gives to children who may yet fail to fully understand 
why they should do something, yet can be taught that they should do it. 
According to the Prolegomena, the Alcibiades provides such admonishments 
in a subtle way. As its author observes, addressing people indirectly about 
their behaviour is oten more efective than confronting them directly. For 
this reason, the Alcibiades deals with ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ,
 (…) not by itself, but in the individual. For thus, when we see other people 
rebuked, for example, or praised, we will sooner be compelled to admit the 
justice of the rebuke or to envy the people who are praised.23 
hus the blame heaped on the historical igure of Alcibiades should serve 
as a lesson to us all, as should Marinus’ praise of the many virtues of Proclus. 
I now intend to show that Damascius’ Life of Isidore, or the Philosophical 
History as is sometimes called, is, at least in part, intended to fulil a similar 
function.
In a stimulating article, Dominic O’Meara (O’Meara 2006) has 
compared Damascius’ Life of Isidore to Marinus’ Life of Proclus. he latter 
work describes how Proclus advances through the diferent stages of virtue 
until he reaches ultimate perfection and deiication. his same Neoplatonic 
scale of virtues, O’Meara demonstrates, is essential for the understanding of 
Damascius’ Life of Isidore. However, whereas Marinus’ biography provides us 
22. I discuss Proclus’ theory of paideia in van den Berg 2014.
23. Anonymous Prolegomena 15, 24-27; trans. Westerink 1962.
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with a Neoplatonic saint, Damascius’ work is populated with people who are 
not even nearly perfect. he patriarch Photius, who—even though we owe 
to him the survival of many fragments of this work—is clearly no friend of 
Damascius, puts this down to Damascius’ desire to glorify himself. O’Meara, 
though, ofers an alternative, more attractive explanation. From the fact that 
he Life of Isidore is dedicated to heodora, an upper class pagan woman 
who had been a student of Damascius, he deduces that Damascius intended 
his book for the ediication of his students and other philosophically minded 
readers.24 Damascius would thus enter in the footsteps of, for example, the 
Platonist Plutarch of Chaereonea, whose famous Parallel Lives recall the 
way in which Damascius likes to juxtapose the people that he describes in 
contrasting pairs.25 As we have seen, Proclus in a similar vein compared “what 
history tells us” about the good politician Pericles to the bad politician Alci-
biades. Damascius in fact explicitly draws attention to the edifying function 
of history in general in the following passage:26
For the polloi the persuasiveness and guidance ofered by history (ǚǏǓǒὼ ǔǋὶ 
ǚǋǛǋǉǗǏǝǓǜ … ἀǚὸ Ǟ˛ǜ ɎǝǞǙǛǉǋǜ) is more itting than that provided by other 
kinds of discourse – ancient rather than recent history, since it conveys so-
mething more familiar to the listener.27 
It seems unlikely, though, that this general remark about the use of history 
applies without qualiication to he Life of Isidore. he intended readership 
of he Life of Isidore, heodora and her friends, would hardly think of 
themselves as hoi polloi. hey were, ater all, members of the pagan Alexan-
drian elite. So were most of the people portrayed by Damascius in he Life 
of Isidore. his is, I suggest, no coincidence. Damascius hoped to persuade 
his readers to pursue the path of virtue by holding their peers from recent 
history up as both positive and negative examples, rather than by lecturing 
them directly about the importance of virtue. Not surprisingly, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ, the 
ambivalent emotion characteristic of the upper class, plays an important role 
in these edifying stories. 
6. Philotimia and philodoxia in Damascius Life of Isidore
Damascius parades a certain Maras from Syria who was extremely wealthy 
as a positive example of political virtue. Richness may bring out the worst in 
someone,
24. O’Meara 2006 p. 88. For Photius’ view on Damascius and heodora, see Photius Bibl. 
181 = Athanassiadi 1999: 335-341 (testimonium III).
25. As O’Meara 2006 p. 82 points out.
26. O’Meara 2006 p. 88 n. 36.
27.  Damascius, Life of Isidore, Fr. 29A Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 54 Zintzen 1967; 
trans. Athanassiadi 1999 adapted.
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(...) but abundance did not induce arrogance (ɮǌǛǓǜ) in him; his extravagant 
wealth was not conspicuous, but he used it as an instrument of justice and 
philanthropy, providing for the needy and eager for honor in public afairs 
(ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǙǧǖǏǗǙǜ ἐǗ ǞǙῖǜ ǚǙǕǓǞǏǧǖǋǝǓǗ). (…) Indeed, he did not consider it just 
behaviour if he merely abstained from wronging any of his fellow-citizens 
but only if he never tired of pouring benefactions on them.28
Damascius here paints a traditional picture of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ: ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ is 
a positive emotion that incites the rich to behave virtuously. In return for 
this, the rich receive the respect that is due to them: Damascius goes on to 
report that “Maras won his way into a proverb on the just treatment of one’s 
neighbours.”29
he story may be compared to Marinus’ discussion of Proclus’ political 
virtues. Proclus by practising generosity, “instilled in Archiadas a certain 
zeal” to do likewise.30 Because of his unparalleled muniicence, he was always 
respectfully called “the most pious Archiadas”, even long ater his death.31 
So, just as Proclus inspired Archiadas to do good by setting an example of 
generosity, thus playing on the competitive ethos of the elite, in the same 
way the examples of Maras and Archiadas, carrying with them the promise 
of lasting public esteem, should stir the readers of Damascius and Marinus 
to do likewise.
In contrast to Maras, ambition did not bring out the best of Severianus. 
his Severianus, who came from one of the best families of Damascus, was a 
typically timocratic man. Damascius describes him as:
(…) ambitious (ǠǓǕǦǎǙǘǙǜ) to an unparalleled degree, yet also bringing to 
light through his honourable deeds and words (ǞǓǖǉǙǓǜ ἔǛǍǙǓǜ ǞǏ ǔǋὶ ǕǦǍǙǓǜ) 
the virtue hidden in his soul.32 
ΦǓǕǙǎǙǘǉǋ is nearly synonymous to ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ, be it that whereas ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ 
may be positive as well as negative, ǠǓǕǙǎǙǘǉǋ has strong negative overtones 
(Nikolaidis 2012 p. 35). he reason why Damascius here uses ǠǓǕǙǎǙǘǉǋ is 
because, even though it prompts Severianus to do honourable deeds (ǞǓǖǉǋ 
ἔǛǍǋ), he did not manage to control his ǒǟǖǦǜ.33 Because of this he was a 
very harsh judge who became responsible for the deaths of a good number of 
28.  Damascius Life of Isidore, Fr. 92, 2-10 Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 226 Zintzen 1967; 
trans. Athanassiadi 1999 adapted.
29. Tr. Athanassiadi 1999; the verb that Damascius uses ἐǘǏǗǉǔǑǝǏǗ (“won his way into”) 
is signiicant: ǠǓǕǦǗǓǔǙǜ (fond of victory) is almost synonymous to ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ, cf., e.g., the 
description of the second-best constitution as ǠǓǕǦǗǓǔǦǜ ǞǏ ǔǋὶ ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ (Plato R. 8, 545a1-2).
30. Marinus Procl. 14, 14, 14: ǔǋὶ ἔǛǍῳ ǎὲ ǐ˛ǕǦǗ ǞǓǗǋ ǋὐǞ̆ ἐǗǇǞǓǔǞǏǗ.
31. Marinus Procl. 14, 25-27: ɺǜ ǔǋὶ ǞǙὺǜ ἐǠ’ Ⱦǖ̅Ǘ ἀǗǒǛǨǚǙǟǜ, ǏἴǚǙǞǏ ἐǒǇǕǙǓǏǗ ǖǗǈǖǑǗ 
ǋὐǞǙῦ ǚǙǓǏῖǝǒǋǓ, Ǚὐǔ ἄǕǕǣǜ ȿ ǞὸǗ ǏὐǝǏǌǇǝǞǋǞǙǗ ἈǛǡǓǆǎǋǗ ǏὐǠǈǖῳ Ǟ̆ ǝǞǦǖǋǞǓ ǔǋǕǏῖǗ.
32. Damascius, Life of Isidore Fr. 108, 22-24 Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 278 Zintzen 1967; 
trans. Athanassiadi 1999 adapted.
33. On what was wrong with Severianus, cf. O’Meara 2006 p. 81.
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people, for which he would later have to pay the price. He could have avoided 
all this, if, as had been his original intention, he had become a philosopher 
rather than a politician. However, his impulsive nature came in the way and 
launched him into his ill-fated political career. Damascius stresses that it was 
not just a matter of “fate and necessity, but also of free choice, which is a bad 
thing”.34 he example of Severianus too must have struck a chord with many 
of Damascius’ elitist readers, who were in a comparable position of having to 
choose between a life of philosophical contemplation and political action.
If Severianus is a bit of a tragic igure because he wrestles with his choice 
in life, this is not the case for the notorious Pamprepius. Damascius describes 
him as “being a lover of honour and not wishing to appear second to anyone”.35 
Since he realised that he could not outdo Proclus in philosophy, he turned to 
literary studies instead. Because of his burning desire to be the number one 
in his ield, he was highly successful, and was, at least for a time, “honoured 
by the Athenians as a very noble teacher”.36 However, his boundless ambition 
not only made him do the most magniicent things, but also the most terrible 
ones,37 so that when Damascius makes up the bill he describes him as a beast 
(ǒǑǛǉǙǗ) and his way of life as the opposite of the perfect Cronian, i.e. aris-
tocratic life of the intellect.38 In short, he is hardly an example to aspire to.
7. Conclusion
Philosophers like to believe that they inluence politicians, and students 
of the history of philosophy are eager to ind clues that such was indeed the 
case. In this paper, however, we have seen the opposite: the impact of political 
reality on the study of philosophy. As the quotation from Peter Brown at the 
start from this paper brought out, ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ was a very powerful element 
in late antique society. Students who came to the Neoplatonists to receive 
the only form of higher education available at that time all belonged to an 
elite that was preoccupied with this consuming desire for public recognition. 
Many promising students like Severianus and Pamprepius, who could have 
continued to become serious philosophers, eventually turned to politics and 
other occupations that ofered better opportunities to gain public honours 
than the metaphysical star-gazing in which the Neoplatonists excelled. In 
34.  Ἡ ǏɍǖǋǛǖǇǗǑ ǔǋὶ Ǟὸ ǡǛǇǣǗ, ἔǞǓ ǎὲ Ǟὸ ǋὐǒǋǉǛǏǞǙǗ, ὅ ǞǓ ἐǝǞǓ ǔǋǔǦǗ, Fr. 108, 16-17 
Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 278 Zintzen 1967.
35. Ὁ ǎὲ ǠǓǕǦǞǓǖǙǜ ɻǗ ǔǋὶ ǙὐǎǏǗὸǜ ἐǒǇǕǣǗ ǠǋǉǗǏǝǒǋǓ ǎǏǧǞǏǛǙǜ, Fr. 112B1 Athanassiadi 
1999, Fr. 289 Zintzen 1967.
36. ἘǞǓǖᾶǞǙ ǚǛὸǜ Ǟ̅Ǘ ἈǒǑǗǋǉǣǗ, Ǚἷǋ ǎǓǎǆǝǔǋǕǙǜ Ǚὐǔ ἀǍǏǗǗǈǜ, Fr. 112B, 16-17 Athanassiadi 
1999, Fr. 290 Zintzen1967.
37. ΠǛǋǍǖǆǞǣǗ … ǖǏǍǉǝǞǣǗ ǞǏ ǔǋὶ ǔǋǔǉǝǞǣǗ, Fr. 112B, 17-18 Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 290 
Zintzen 1967.
38. Fr. 112A Athanassiadi 1999, Fr. 287 Zintzen 1967.
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this way, political reality put the topic of ǠǓǕǙǞǓǖǉǋ on the Neoplatonic 
agenda. If it had not been so important in society, it would not have become 
a central issue in the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Alcibiades, the very 
irst dialogue that those students read. Neither would it have played such a 
prominent role in Damascius’ Life of Isidore. Even though it may sometimes 
seem diferently, the Neoplatonists did not work in splendid isolation from 
the brutal outside world.
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